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The changing nature of the relationship between the Irish state and local 
development under the impact of globalisation is a key theme of this 
collection. Both Kirby and Jacobson (Chapter 1) and Tierney (Chapter 5) 
employ the concept of the competition state theory to examine ways in which 
this relationship is changing. In a similar fashion, this chapter uses 
competition state theory to examine how Irish social security and labour 
market policy has changed over the past decade. Section One develops some 
working hypotheses about how globalisation impacts on social security and 
local development. The main body of the chapter, Section Two, examines how 
Irish social security has changed sine 1987 and how such change impacts on 
local development.  Section Three outlines the emerging social security policy 
agenda as developed in the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) 
report on the Developmental Welfare State (2005) and the National Economic 
and Social Forum (NESF) report entitled Creating an Inclusive Labour Market 
(Report No. 33) and highlights potential implications for local development. 
Section Four asks what can be done to secure more egalitarian outcomes from 




COMPETITION STATE  
In earlier chapters, Kirby and Jacobson, and Tierney describe how the 
competition state prioritises economic competitiveness over social cohesion 
and welfare. This does not mean welfare spending is curtailed, rather it is 
reshaped to serve economic objectives. This reshaping means traditional 
social policy objectives of poverty reduction and equality now take second 
place to a commitment to the promotion of competitiveness (Cerny et al 2005: 
20). In a competition state, low taxation and wage moderation create pressure 
on public-sector spending and limit the state’s capacity to fund social security 
more generously.  Public goods, related to social justice and redistribution, 
are increasingly privatised, while their distribution becomes more consumer 
driven and less based on rights derived from citizenship. Increased women’s 
labour-market participation impacts on the capacity of families to provide 
welfare and results in greater reliance on market-based provision of both 
child and elder care.  Fiscal pressures cause shifts to more targeted means-
tested social protection. Reliance on targeted and ungenerous transfer 
payments increases the depth of poverty and widens income inequalities.  
New forms of inequality emerge where those with weak capacity to 
participate in the labour market suffer most, resulting in the “pauperisation of 
segments of society” (Cerny et al., 2005: 29). This happens at individual level, 
but it also leads to widening regional and local inequalities.   
 
The most fundamental competition state shift is from a redistributive welfare 
system that “decommodifies” citizens or protects them from having to 
depend on the market for an income, towards a productivist workfare state 
that “commodifies” citizens by  encouraging and/or requiring them to work. 
The welfare system becomes more active, and is designed to facilitate people 
into employment. Public investment focuses on enhancing labour supply 
through learning and training. Rights become conditional and linked to the 
obligation to participate in the labour market. Supportive carrots and/or 
punitive sanctions encourage and/or compel labour market participation. 
Cerny (2005: 18) defines workfare as “new regulations and programmes 
designed to enable or compel the poor to enter the labour market through a 
combination of offensive carrots (training, education, employment subsidies) 
and defensive sticks (reduced and time-limited benefits’ Crucially he 
identifies local capacity as being key to deliver empowering offensive 
programmes or “good policy” and that ‘activation polices are implemented in 
a multilevel governance structure’ that can flexibly respond to local labour 
market needs Torping  and be held accountable by local governance. 
(1999p18).  Finn (2000;44) also emphasises the ‘local dimension’ in active 
benefit regimes which are linked to radical changes in bureaucracies and 
institutions including decentralization and break down of public sector 
monopolies.     
 
From the theory outlined above it is possible to identify four types of social 
security reform that we might expect to see emerging in the Irish competition 
state. These are:  regulation, retrenchment, residualisation, and 
recommodification.1 The following section outlines each of these and reviews 
how each applies in the Irish case.  
 
 
IRISH SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 
As well as describing how Irish social security policy has developed by using 
the typology of welfare reform introduced above, this section also highlights 
the local development implications of such reforms.  The aim of such a review 
is not to prove Irish social security reform is consistent with these indicators, 
rather it is to use these indicators as a framework which might help us 
understand how Irish social security is changing and how that change might 
be impacting at a local level and on local development.   
 
                                                 
1  The author developed these indicators drawing on work by Pierson (2001) and Cerny (2005).   
 
 Regulation: A regulatory competition state attempts “to steer not row” 
(Cerny et al., 2005: 17) and avoids direct service delivery . It promotes arms 
length regulation to lessen its direct delivery role,  policy making and 
implementation are delegated to new actors at national and local levels.  
Privatisation of provision occurs directly or by organising public service 
delivery around commercial or market consumer principles. It can be 
illustrated by examining three trends: regulation, privatisation and new 
public management.  
 
Regulation: A regulatory state “provides a framework of rules and 
performance indicators or targets for market actors to follow” (Cerny et al., 
2005: 17). This leads to a more fragmented and complex system of governance 
with more agencies (including local partnerships) involved in policy making 
and implementation. Over the last two decades the Irish state has made some 
attempts to divest itself of responsibility for social inclusion. In promoting the 
social inclusion role of the non-profit private sector the Programme for 
Economic and Social Progress (PESP, 1990) initiated the first local Area Based 
Partnerships to which it subsequently delegated employment support 
functions including the Local Employment Service. A 2000 White Paper, 
Supporting Voluntary Activity sought to define and regulate the relationship 
between the state and the community and voluntary sector .  NESC (2005: 
206-7) proposes a further shift in governance by redefining the role of the 
state as a regulator of rights rather than a provider of services and standards 
as an enabler of “local activist networks”. One can only speculate about the 
potential changes that this could involve, but it is likely that arrangements 
governing payment of income support will change over time and could 
possibly extend to local based non-statutory organisations. Such regulatory 
trends are likely to increase as EU procurement processes and the 
forthcoming EU Services Directive oblige tendering, to private and public 
bodies, of delivery services previously monopolised by statutory bodies (for 
example An Post’s social security delivery contracts). 
 
Privatisation:  The government invitation to the private pension industry to 
chair the National Pensions Board has co-incided with a private, business-led 
style of governance promoting the commodification or privatisation of 
pensions in the Pensions (Amendment) Act 2002 which introduced second-
tier private Pension Savings Retirement Accounts. Foreign Direct Investment 
has also had a direct impact on social protection. International companies 
structurally impact on work-related social-protection provision through 
providing private health and pensions packages. This had led to a structural 
shift where the numbers dependent on the state for social protection has 
declined to the extent that the NESC (2005) fears Ireland may be reaching the 
tipping point where the middle classes become independent of an 
increasingly residualised welfare state. A further but failed example of the 
state’s attempt to divest itself of its traditional social protection role was when 
attempts to transfer disability protection to employers were blocked by the 
veto power of employers in both 1988 and 1992.  This contrasts with the 
British experience where the state was able to transfer this function to private 
business. Irish government appears more vulnerable to veto players blocking 
policy and less able to divest social protection functions than are other 
European states. 
 
New public management: The challenge of delivering social security and 
controlling fraud dominated the state’s concern during periods of high 
unemployment. However, there has been a considerable improvement in the 
standards of service delivery in part due to the influence of consumerism, 
choice and new public management discourse evident in the Strategic 
Management Initiative and the Public Services Management Act (1997). 
Initiatives like “customer service plans”, “customer service targets”, “service 
delivery models” and “expenditure reviews” emphasising value for money 
have all impacted on local policy implementation and policy development 
DSFCA 2000a, 2000b. This impacts locally, many local organisations report 
administrative nightmares and problems with audits and monitoring.  At the 
same time, compared to other countries there is considerable resistance to 
new public management practices and institutional change in the Irish public 
service (NESC, 2002).  The end result is uneven: while there is strong evidence 
of the state engaging in a new public management ethos of customer-focused 
delivery, this has not always transformed staff and claimant experience of 
social security delivery to the degree that such change transformed practice in 
the UK (Pollit, 2005).   
 
Retrenchment: The “low tax, low inflation” ethos of the Irish development 
model dominates fiscal policy and is reinforced in the EU’s Growth and 
Stability Pact. Retrenchment happens when specific social security policies are 
cut back because of short-term or long-term fiscal pressure. We now examine 
three types of retrenchment: short-term cost cutting, longer-term cost 
containment and, finally, cost avoidance.  
 
Cost cutting: Not surprisingly competition state theorists expect low-tax 
neoliberal economic models to lead to budgetary constraints. It is true that 
Economic and Monetary Union convergence criteria limiting budget deficits 
have proved problematic for many European welfare states. In the Irish case,  
however,  while  low-tax policy resulted in reductions in corporate, capital 
gains and income tax rates,  given the scale of economic growth over the last 
decade Ireland did not see a corresponding decrease in revenue and 
consequently there was less cost cutting than might otherwise have been 
expected.  The exceptional Irish economic success and limited pressures from 
an ageing population meant that, over this period, Ireland had budget 
surpluses and the capacity to expand social security rates and coverage so 
that social assistance payments increased considerably. However, an 
exception were the considerable cuts in the safety-net Supplementary Welfare 
Allowance scheme, which had been expanded in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, but was considerably restricted in the last decade. Two sets of social 
security cuts, the 1992 “Dirty Dozen” and the 2003 “Savage Sixteen” were 
short-term responses to periods of tight fiscal austerity (the 1992 EMU 
preparations and the post 9/11 recession in 2002-03). Both sets of cuts 
happened when inexperienced first time (rural) Ministers were unable to 
resist strong pressure from Department of Finance officials to cut social 
security budgets. These cuts are exceptions that prove the rule. Politicians, 
especially those in proportional representation electoral systems, avoid blame 
associated with direct social security cuts which, more than any other kind of 
public spending cuts, are transparent to claimants (Pierson 1998).   
 
Other cuts such as the 1994 child income support reforms which froze the 
monetary value of means-tested child-dependant allowances, reflect policy 
restructuring designed to increase work incentives rather than being caused 
by fiscal pressures.2 Specific social insurance cuts including the 1994 abolition 
of pay-related benefit, the taxation of  benefits and a tightening of  eligibility 
were also motivated by work-incentive policy.   
 
Cost containment: The Irish story is not one of retrenchment due to immediate 
fiscal pressures but of “arrested development” where governments abstain 
from using the fruits of economic growth to expand and improve social 
protection to the degree that might have been anticipated as a result of 
economic growth (Alber and Standing, 2000: 99). These less obvious long-
term cost-containment policies have had a serious impact on Irish society and 
on levels of poverty and inequality. Irish social security policy has been 
dominated by a stubborn commitment to refuse to index social security 
payments to any form of wage growth.  The strength of this policy position is 
                                                 
2 NESC (2005:52) notes how this reform impacted on the distributional outcome of child income 
support. The value of child income support for higher-income groups receiving only universal child 
benefit payments increased by 173% over the 1994-2004 period while low-income families relying on 
the combined child-dependant allowances and child benefit experienced only a 52% increase over the 
same period. 
reinforced by the degree to which the Department of Finance, with its concern 
for controlling expenditure, dominates the setting of social security rates. 1998 
Proposals in DSFCA (1998)3 for a pensions adequacy benchmark and in 
DSFCA (2001)4 for an adequacy benchmark for the lowest social assistance 
payments were rejected by an advocacy coalition of the Department of 
Finance, employers’ representatives and the Department of Enterprise, Trade 
and Employment. This advocacy coalition was motivated by a combination of 
future cost containment, maintenance of work incentives and maintaining a 
level of flexibility considered essential to adapt to the global economy. In this 
way a direct line can be traced between globalisation and social security 
policy, although it is also true that the Department of Finance has long held 
the view that social security rates policy should be determined in such a way 
as to maintain work incentives and has, since independence, taken a strongly 
conservative stance on public expenditure. 
 
More puzzling is the failure to index-link earned income disregards, such as 
rent allowance disregards and lone parents income disregards, the real value 
of which had decreased substantially since they were last increased in 1994, as 
many local development organisations have highlighted. (Earned income 
disregards allow claimants disregard a certain amount of earnings from social 
assistance means tests and are therefore considered an important welfare to 
work incentive.) As NESF (2006) has pointed out, freezing income disregards 
makes work incentive policy less effective and is inconsistent with a 
productivist-focused competition state. This is confirmed in detailed analysis 
by Loftus (2006). Such deviation might be again explained by a shortsighted 
Department of Finance dominating annual budget negotiations and more 
interested in cost cutting. Policy inconsistency in this area might also be 
explained by the differing emphasis political parties place on the role of 
                                                 
3 National Irish Pensions Initiative majority recommendation. 
4 PPF Benchmarking and Indexation Working Group 2001 majority recommendation. 
supportive income disregards in employment policy and the different values 
political parties place on the role and function of social security5.   
 
Cost avoidance: There is evidence of significant “cost avoidance” and resistance 
to accommodate new social risks through the social security system. The 
significant increases in the labour-market participation of women happened 
without substantial social-security restructuring to enable such participation 
or to respond to emerging social-care needs. Irish social security remains 
based on a strong male-breadwinner regime with structural barriers to 
women registering as unemployed or accessing labour market supports. 
Reliance on market-led responses to childcare (NDP, 2000a) means childcare 
subsidies, maternity leave and paid parental leave are underdeveloped 
relative to other countries. Eldercare responses are limited to tax incentives to 
provide private nursing homes.  Failure to individualise social security or to 
introduce child and eldercare supports is paradoxical in a competition state 
aiming to increase the labour-force participation of mothers. A neoliberal 
fixation on low state intervention partially explains those policy choices. 
However policy inaction is not just about ideology or cost avoidance. Policy 
paralysis is also due to politicians’ fear of introducing reforms in the absence 
of policy consensus. It has been politically difficult in Ireland to mediate 
between political advocacy coalitions6 advocating conflicting policy options. 
Policy is also limited by the strong veto power of employers who resist 
parental leave policies. The lack of policy to promote women’s economic 
participation is also due to a deeply rooted ideological ambiguity about 
mothers’ labour market participation in a conservative, patriarchal political 
culture (McLaughlin, 2001).  
 
                                                 
5 Fianna Fáil’s ad hoc use of social security to enhance electoral outcomes (McCashin, 2004) can be 
contrasted to the Labour Party’s commitment to a more planned approach to social security policy 
development (Murphy 2006).  
6 Montague (2003) describes three key policy coalitions comprised of SIPTU and IBEC lobbying for 
tax relief, the Open Your Eyes to Child Poverty Initiative lobbying for child benefit increases and a 
Childcare 2000 campaign lobbying for a parental childcare payment and a “Women in the home” lobby 
group campaigning against tax relief. 
Finally, the state has sought to avoid the potential social security costs of 
asylum seekers and migrant workers. State policy is to exclude these needs 
from Irish social security and to leave migrants to the mercy of the market.7 
Asylum seekers are limited to “direct provision” welfare entitlements. The 
Government responded to EU enlargement with legislation limiting welfare 
entitlement to “habitual residents”. As a result of direct lobbying from 
international companies, legislation was introduced to exempt certain non-EU 
migrant workers from social insurance coverage. Here we see evidence of 
increasingly complex and fragmented governance, with legislation 
concerning social protection policy and social rights imposed by the Minister 
for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, spread across a number of different 
departments with conflicting objectives  and where social objectives are 
subordinated to  economic and foreign policy objectives .  
 
Residualisation: Competition state theory predicts new forms of inequality as 
well as increased gaps between rich and poor. Employment routes out of 
poverty are prioritised and low welfare rates are maintained to promote work 
incentives. Those who cannot exercise employment routes out of poverty such 
as the elderly, people with disabilities and those involved in “caring” duties 
at home are more vulnerable in “the increasing relative gulf between the rich 
and poor” (Cerny et al., 2005: 20). Here Irish trends towards the greater use of 
targeted means tested payments, increased relative poverty, and shifts in the 
risk of relative poverty are reviewd.  
 
More use of means testing: As NESC (2005: xvi) observes: “Ireland is exceptional 
within the EU for the high proportion of its social spending which is means 
tested”.  Despite employment growth, decreases in unemployment and 
inward migration of labour, levels of dependency on social welfare among 
                                                 
7 The 1999 decision to deny asylum seekers the right to work might be explained by national security 
concerns taking precedence over those of social and economic policy departments (who support the 
right of asylum seekers to seek work) and of transnational coalitions seeking to harmonise EU asylum 
policy.   
 
those of working age remain high8.  Therefore, Ireland already exhibits this 
key competition state characteristic of reliance on targeted transfer payments.  
Such path dependency would be reinforced by the recommendation (in 
NESC, 2005) that Ireland maintain its hybrid model and its reliance on means-
tested payments9.  
 
Greater Inequality: Irish income support policy has always promoted low 
replacement rates and a minimal subsistence type of support (O’Connor, 
2005: 35,101) and Ireland has always been characterised by significant income 
inequality. Over the last decade, for reasons of fiscal and work incentive, 
welfare payments have declined relative to average net earnings and so 
income distribution inequalities have increased. Those relying primarily on 
social welfare, particularly those in receipt of social assistance means-tested 
payments, are most likely to fall below poverty lines linked to average 
incomes. This pauperisation of segments of society is directly attributable to a 
conscious policy decision to keep social-welfare payments low.  While fewer 
people were unemployed, the risk of poverty for those remaining 
unemployed doubled from 23.9 per cent in 1994 to 43.1 per cent in 2001, while 
for older people the risk increased from 5.3 per cent in 1994 to 49 per cent in 
2001 (ESRI, 2003: Table 4.22). The share of income of the bottom 10 per cent of 
the income distribution declined from 2.28 per cent of total income in 198710 
to 1.74 per cent in 200311. While the measure of poverty based on consistent 
deprivation fell, the inequality indicator or relative income poverty, increased 
to 21.3 per cent (CSO, 2005), the highest relative income poverty in the EU 
where the average is 15 per cent (Eurostat).   
 
                                                 
8 Benefit dependency rose from 12.4% in 1980 to hold constant at 20% for claimants (37% for all adult 
and child recipients) over 1985-2005. 
9 This recommendation is a significant policy shift from the previous 1986 Commission on Social 
Welfare consensus recommendation to expand social insurance coverage and over time reduce the use 
of social assistance payments.  
10 1987 Household Budget survey 
11 2003 EU SILC 
Shift in who is vulnerable: Table 4.1 shows how those most distant from the 
labour market (older people, carers, women in the home, lone parents and 
people with disabilities) become most vulnerable to poverty. Those with 
disabilities are now most likely to experience poverty while the aged lone 
parent and caring claimants are increasingly likely to experience relative 
poverty12. Consistent with competition state hypotheses about the “working 
poor”,  those in work experienced a 6 per cent increased risk of poverty.  
NESF (2006) confirms that 14 per cent of those in poverty are now in 
employment. This has huge implications for the work of local development 
agencies, whom they target and what services they deliver. 
 
Table 4.1 Percentage of persons below 60% of median income by labour 
force status   
 1994 1997 1998 2000 2001 2003  
Employee 3.2 4.7 2.6 6.5 8.1 9.2 
Self Employed 16.0 14.4 16.4 17.9 14.3 - 
Farmer 18.6 16.7 23.9 24.1 23.0 - 
Unemployed 51.4 57.7 58.8 57.1 44.7 42.1 
Ill/Disabled 29.5 52.5 54.5 52.2 66.5 54.0 
Retired 8.2 13.5 18.4 30.3 36.9 31.0 
Home Duties 20.9 32.6 46.8 44.3 46.9 37.0 
 Source: CSO (2005), European Survey on Income and Living Conditions, first results, 2003 
 
Recommodification:  The principle of designing social security to preserve 
work incentives has always informed Irish social security policy. However the 
1990s saw a new focus on “performative inclusion” and more active social 
policy, including the provision of employment-support services (Dukelow, 
2004: 16-18) and activation policies including increased use of income 
disregards and programmes like Back to Work Allowance programmes first 
                                                 
12 Table 4.1 shows how the risk of relative poverty has shifted from the unemployed (down by 9%) to 
the ill/disabled (up 24%), the retired (up 23 per cent) and women on home duties (up 16%).   
piloted in the area based partnerships in 1992 (McCashin, 2004: 211). This 
section seeks to establish the particular style and scale of Irish 
recommodification. It reviews three key trends: spending on active measures, 
changes in “conditionality” and the extension of activation beyond 
unemployed claimants,   
 
Active labour-market programmes: Significant active labour-market expenditure 
is a long-standing feature of the Irish welfare state13.   NESF (2006, 29) 
concludes that over €1bn is spent on Irish active labour-market programmes 
but that these achieve only limited progress in accessing employment for the 
economically excluded. Despite a consensus that such programmes do not 
achieve their objectives it has proved difficult to reform them.  The range of 
active labour-market programmes is spread across a number of government 
Departments and the development of effective active labour-market policy 
has been hampered by institutional competition between these Departments 
and by political expediency in responding to local pressures to retain 
programmes for social policy rather than labour-market reasons (Boyle 2005). 
Local development institutions have been part of this local political debate 
and have played their own role in vetoing what may have been necessary 
reforms. While programmes have become more progression-oriented, the 
NESF (2006) urged “radical reform”, arguing that greater cohesion can be 
achieved through the coordination and integration role of the County and 
City Development Boards.  This poses a clear challenge for the local 
development sector.   
 
Conditionality: Many observers, including OECD experts, Martin and Grubb 
(2002) and Pearson (2003) conclude that, relative to other English speaking 
regimes or small open economies, compulsion is remarkably absent in the 
                                                 
13 As a high net recipient of EU Structural funds, Ireland was required to increase spending on active 
labour market policies as a condition for receipt of these funds.  
Irish policy regime14. The foci of the NESF (Report No 4, 1994) 
recommendation for a voluntary Local Employment Service and the 1998 
National Employment Action Plan on voluntary systematic engagement have 
meant that local development agencies have not been party to “punitive” 
style labour-market interventions. There is no data sharing between social 
security and labour market institutions. However, Irish policy has always 
been based on significant supportive and punitive policy. The sanctions 
available under rules that govern those regarded as genuinely seeking work 
are relatively strong and, with the exception of times of very high 
unemployment,  have been regularly applied. In addition there is a strong 
control and antifraud culture and rhetoric.15
   
Extension of conditionality beyond unemployed claimants: Ireland still deviates 
from a strong model of conditionality in its reluctance to extend 
conditionality to lone parents, the spouses of male claimants and people with 
disabilities. DSFCA (2000c) explains that such reluctance to extend 
conditionality is due to the lack of a coherent childcare infrastructure and 
services for people with disabilities (DSFA 2003).  There is also the fear of a 
political backlash from significant groups of the electorate. The NESC 
proposal that all social assistance payments enable “a lifetime attachment to 
the labour force” reflects a significant shift in consensus (NESC, 2005). NESC’s 
analysis also reflects a growing tendency within public sector organisations to 
identify claimants by reference to their relationship with the labour market – 
claimants  are young, old or of “working age”16.  
                                                 
14 McCashin (2004: 220), Van Oorschot (2002), McLaughlin (2001), Boyle (2005: 59), O Connell and 
O’Riain (2000: 334) and Daly and Yeates (2003: 94). 
15 The 1987 ‘Jobsearch’ programme was followed by changes in 1992 increasing sanctions for 
voluntary employment loss or the failure to take up a labour-market programme. The Live Register 
Management Unit was established in 1996 to seek “a more effective application of conditionality” 
Dukelow (2004: 22). April 1997 and June 1998 regulations tightened availability and job-seeking 
guidelines. Appeals Office data shows that, since the 1997 National Employment Action Plan (NEAP), 
there has been a substantial rise in use of sanctions although this has now eased.    
16 Cousins notes the significance of this new focus on “working age”. The language, more developed 
in UK policy discourse, is highly ideologically motivated implying that those of working age should be 
at work. He notes the approach has important gender implications, placing all working aged claimants 
including mothers, on an employability continuum.  
 Conclusion: Irish social security reform has its own distinctive style, pace and 
discourse and Irish social security is still in the process of becoming a fully-
fledged competition state “workfare state” where social security is used as a 
“tool of commodification” (Holden, 2003) to attach people to the workforce. 
The slow cautious pace of the Irish social security change agenda means Irish 
social security policy has not yet adapted enough to the needs of 
competitiveness (Cousins, 2005: 339) nor fully embraced the concept of a 
comprehensive welfare work strategy ( NESF 2000: 65, Loftus,  2005, NESF 
2006).   This suggests there is more commodification to come but what shape 
will it take?  
 
The distinctive Irish mix of “supportive conditionality” and “sensitive 
activation” is an outcome of how policy was debated in Irish political culture. 
The local development institutions and the local employment service play a 
role in ensuring that even though Ireland is a strong exemplar of the 
competition state, its activation policy is more offensive than defensive. 
Engaging in the politics of such reform is crucial for those seeking to influence 
the reform towards more egalitarian outcomes.  Local development agencies 
as political actors have a crucial role to play in shaping future reform agendas. 
 
NESC’S DEVELOPMENTAL WELFARE STATE 
What will happen next? Cerny et al (2005: 20) are relatively optimistic that it is 
possible to innovate creatively within the neoliberal playing field of the 
competition state. There is room to manoeuvre and reshape the social 
dimension of politics towards what they describe as “social neoliberalism” 
where some new compromise is reached ON conflicting economic and social 
goals. The NESC Developmental Welfare State (2005) represents an attempt to 
reinvent or reshape the Irish welfare state. NESC (2005: 1) leaves no doubt 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
that “the social dividend of strong economic performance must … take forms 
that are supportive of the country’s ongoing ability to trade advantageously 
in the world economy”, and goes on to proposes an alternative 
conceptualisation of the welfare state to steer future reforms.  “The 
developmental welfare state” proposes three overlapping domains of welfare 
state activity: core services, income supports and activist measures.   
 
1. NESC argues that in contemporary Ireland access to core services has 
“a wholly new resonance; they underpin the social and economic 
participation of an increasingly diverse population and enhance labour 
market flexibility and competitiveness” (2005, 155).  The provision of 
such services would require reform of existing services such as 
education and a hastening of the development of innovative services, 
for example childcare.   
 
2. Income support measures need to provide adequate subsistence and 
participation in society whereby payment arrangements for people of 
working aged are delivered in a more conditional framework and are 
tailored to support employment or other social activities. For those of 
working age, payment arrangements should encourage labour-market 
participation and lifetime attachment to the labour force. Whether such 
arrangements are supportive or punitive in less clear, but the emphasis 
leans towards a supportive and offensive workfare model that Cerny 
might term “social neoliberalism”.  
 
3. The third platform of the Developmental Welfare State is comprised of 
innovative pro-active measures in which non-governmental 
organisations respond to social needs rather than these being met 
through core public services. Some of these projects may terminate 
following success and the solution of a particular issue, other outcomes 
might see embedding the local initiative as a mainstream or core public 
service (NESC, 2005: 157-8).   
 
 
This reshaping of the welfare state has potentially huge but unclear 
implications for local development.  Local activist innovative networks are 
envisaged as a core part of the developmental welfare state. This suggests that 
local area based partnerships might be reshaped to respond to unmet social 
needs in a framework where the state regulates rights and standards and 
where the activist providers are accountable to and monitored by the state. 
This could take the shape of service-level agreements to regulate the funding 
relationship between the state and non-statutory service providers. It is 
difficult to envisage this without devolution and significant local government 
reform but, as Ó Broin comments in Chapter 8, there is little confidence that 
this is a political priority. Experience of the role of County and City 
Development Boards and their relationship with local partnerships has been 
mixed. The integration of public services and the voluntary and community 
sector is complex and while the NESC document acknowledges that this will 
require an enhancement of “network management” expertise for public 
administrators and increased accountability there is no real evaluation of the 
practical steps that need to be taken to achieve this. So far, the process which 
aims to integrate local government and local development has lacked clear 
vision from all relevant actors of a new form of innovative local governance.   
McCarthy in Chapter 6 sees political space for partnerships to influence this 
future shaping and challenges partnerships to innovate about this future. 
 
TOWARDS AN EGALITARIAN FUTURE  
The strategically ambivalent and hesitant language in NESC (2005) reflects an 
ongoing struggle to forge consensus between different advocacy coalitions 
and signals a likely slow and incremental journey to this reshaped 
Developmental Welfare State. How this will be done is not obvious. As Cerny  
  
et al. remind us, “the field of political choice and innovation is quite broad” 
(2005: 7).  Local development agencies will play a key delivery role through 
local employment services and the development of innovative activist, 
education and training programmes to support people participate in a more 
conditional and active social policy environment.  
 
Competition state theory stresses that even high levels of globalisation bring 
opportunities as well as threats. It stresses that there is room for manoeuvre. 
It stresses political agency and the role played by domestic institutions and 
practices, local, national and international interest groups in determining 
policy choices (Cerny et al 2005: 7). Cerny identifies a future of “plurilateral” 
negotiations which aim to “coordinate myriad diverse actions –and to bring 
wider and more disparate coalitions into potentially tenuous forms of 
collective action”. Clearly, local area-based partnerships, community 
development organisations, local employment services, drugs task forces and 
local government agencies have a pivotal role to play in this emerging 
“plurilateral and multilateral world”. 
 
NESF (2006) tries to shape this new approach and recommends that a 
National Strategic Framework would support a Local Partnership Network 
based on interagency working of statutory and non-statutory local service 
providers who work through annual Service Delivery Agreements. These 
would be coordinated at county level but in Dublin there would be a number 
focusing on main areas of disadvantage. They would operate to help people 
into work and to stay in work. NESF propose four pilot projects should run in 
2006 with full implementation in 2007. 
 
 To implement the active social policy concept in NESC’s Developmental 
Welfare State (2005) and NESF’s  Inclusive Labour Market (2006),  Irish policy 
must reconcile ambivalent social policy objectives. “Activation” opens up 
uncertainty about entitlement, as claims become conditional on compliance 
with activation obligations. An emancipatory model for labour market 
activation of social welfare claimants, proportionately balances the dual roles 
of active social policy with more traditional social protection and social rights. 
Legal, administrative and monitoring safeguards can counterbalance the 
power to set behavioural conditions on people’s lives by limiting the capacity 
of agencies to deny key social rights (Van Aershot, 2003).   Best practice in this 
area includes strong accountable local municipalities. This suggests that local 
government reform and the emerging space in local governance may be able 
to play a powerful and innovative role in a positive developmental welfare 
state.    
 
CONCLUSION 
Hemerijck (2003) comments how “in many countries a lively debate is taking 
place on the moral foundations of existing welfare arrangements and on the 
need to rethink such foundations”. The NESC DWS (2005) has been described 
by one of the authors as an attempt to “reposition or relaunch” (Sweeney 
2005) the Irish welfare state. The project is not unlike similar Dutch and 
Danish attempts to construct debate about welfare reform by reshaping 
issues, concepts and ideological language in ways that generate political space 
and momentum in relation to welfare reform (Cox , 2001). In a consensus-
dominated political culture, it is difficult to promote qualitative policy debate 
and so far it has proved impossible to promote lively national debate about 
welfare reform. To date, the thinking about reinventing social policy and the 
developmental welfare state has taken place behind closed doors in national 
social partnership institutions. The challenge is to create a more 
communicative public debate about the desirability of a more egalitarian 
model of inclusion.  Local development agencies have a key role in shaping 
this debate and to influence the shape of the future.  
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